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1 Introduction
In the insurance literature discussions of moral hazard have focused traditionally on its
effects on policy-holders’ behaviour:  the fact that policy-holders could recover the
cost of losses reduced the incentive to minimise any losses or to incur costs (financial
or psychic) in order to cut the probability of loss.  More recently, however, attention
has turned to the moral hazard inherent in government guarantees, following on the
similar analysis applied to deposit-taking institutions.  In this case the focus is on the
bank, thrift institution or insurance company concerned, rather than on the depositor or
policy-holder, and the moral hazard is an indirect consequence of the absence of
counter-party credit risk, which enables the institution to alter its behaviour.
Specifically, because the depositor or policy-holder does not have to take account of
the financial strength (or covenant) of the financial institution concerned, that
institution will have an incentive to pursue more profitable, but riskier, policies than
would otherwise be the case.  Therefore, unless the government guarantee is
associated with more effective peer group pressure or tighter regulation, the presence
of guarantees should be associated with a tendency to greater risk exposure.  In the
case of insurance this might take the form of a riskier structure for investment
portfolios, a lower solvency margin, greater risk exposure in the business written, or
lower premiums for a given risk.  In the US the S&L debacle provided incontrovertible
evidence of the effects of moral hazard on deposit-taking institutions, while in the
insurance field the diversity of government guarantees between States has enabled
investigators to identify differences in risk exposure that are associated with differing
guarantee arrangements.
2
In the UK there have not, to my knowledge, been studies of the effects of policy-
holder protection on insurance company behaviour, and it is unlikely that any effects
could be discerned:  policy-holder protection was introduced in the aftermath of
insurance company failures, there has been a tightening of regulatory arrangements,
and the costs of any failures are borne by competitors, who therefore have an interest
in ensuring that the regulators are sufficiently well-informed to prevent undue risk
exposure.   In Lloyd’s, however, the UK does have a market that is affected by
comparable arrangements, in that policy-holders who place business with any Lloyd’s
syndicate have the implicit guarantee of the Lloyd’s policy.  As a result, the individual
syndicates are not subject to the discipline of counterparty credit risk assessment, and
the potential for moral hazard to affect behaviour exists.
3  The experience of Lloyd’s in
                                                            
1 I am indebted to Lee Redding  for perceptive comments at a Department of Economics seminar.
2 See Brewer and others (1997) for evidence from life insurance and Lee and others (1995 pp. 8-9.])
for evidence from property-liability insurance.
3 This problem of moral hazard was identified in the Walker Report (1992) on Lloyd’s syndicate
participations and the LMX spiral, particularly p.17, paragraph 3.10.the period from 1970 to 1990  provides a case study of the effect of guarantees in the
absence of adequate regulation.
While theoretical analysis tends to stress the effect of this moral hazard on shareholder
behaviour, because it is the shareholder who receives the rewards from providing risk-
bearing capital, in practice it is the executive management, whose interests are unlikely
to be fully aligned with those of shareholders, who take the relevant decisions.  In
particular, when job-security and remuneration depend on short-term performance, the
reward to risk ratio for managers may be higher than for shareholders, and lead them
to pursue more aggressive policies than would be in the interests of the shareholders
themselves.  The focus of this study is therefore on the behaviour of the Working
Names, i.e. management, at Lloyd’s, who were responsible for raising capital and
deploying it on insurance business.
Section 2 below sets out the structure of  Lloyd’s so far as is necessary for this paper,
Sections 3 to 5 deal in turn with three distinct aspects of the effects of moral hazard on
behaviour at Lloyd’s, while section 6 demonstrates the consequences for premium
rates, retentions, and the distribution of losses.  Conclusions are summarised in the
final section.
2 The Structure of Lloyd’s
4
The Lloyd’s market has a unique structure.   The capital-support is provided by
Names, who are divided into two broad categories: Working Names, who have some
business involvement with the market and who may exercise control over the
deployment of capital or underwriting; and External Names, who provide the bulk of
the capital-support, but who have no executive function in the market.  Like
shareholders in insurance companies, external Names bear the underwriting risks and
receive the profits (after all expenses), though unlike shareholders their liability to meet
underwriting losses is, at least in principle, unlimited.
As a condition of admission to Lloyd’s, external Names must provide evidence of
some minimum level of personal wealth. The amount of business (measured by
premium income) that a Name may underwrite - the Name’s capacity - is linked to the
level of “means” shown, and the Name’s Lloyd’s deposit, i.e. funds held at or readily
available to Lloyd’s - is determined by his capacity.
Every Name’s capacity is allocated to a range of syndicates, run by  Managing Agents.
These managing agents, through the underwriters they employ, arrange the insurance
business written by the syndicate.  Each syndicate specialises in particular kinds of
business, e.g. motor, marine, catastrophe reinsurance.  The syndicate underwriters are
the key working Names, who have day-to-day responsibility for the risk-exposure and
profitability of their syndicate’s business.  Part of the remuneration of both managing
agents and their underwriters takes the form of profit-commission.
                                                            
4 This description applies to Lloyd’s in the 1970s and 1980s, and is intended to give only a broad
outline of the key aspects relevant to the issues discussed in this article.The responsibility for recruiting and managing Names’ relationships with Lloyd’s is in
the hands of Members’ Agents, and in practice it is normally the members’ agents who
decide on and arrange the syndicate-participations of their Names,  thus effectively
controlling their overall risk-exposure.   Part of the members’ agent’s remuneration
also takes the form of profit-commission.
Most of the funds at Lloyd’s are held by managing agents in premium trust funds, and
claims arising from policies written are normally met out of these funds, with the back-
up of Names’ deposits and other funds at Lloyd’s and, if necessary, calls for further
funds from Names’ personal wealth.   In the event of  a managing agent’s premium
trust fund being exhausted, and of any Name having insufficient funds at Lloyd’s and
failing to pay a call, the syndicate has recourse to the Lloyd’s Central Fund to ensure
that claims are paid.
5 All Names contribute annually to this fund, and it may also be
augmented by levies; contributions and levies depend on Names’ capacity at Lloyd’s,
but not on the kind of business they write or their risk-exposure.  Since Names are
liable individually only for their own shares of any syndicate losses, it is the Central
Fund and its associated arrangements
6  that provide the guarantee that claims on
Lloyd’s policies will be paid in full.
7
Within this structure there are a number of ways in which moral hazard emanating
from the mutual guarantee might have influenced behaviour.  First, since policy-holders
did not need to be concerned with the financial strength of the individual Names, it
could have affected the behaviour of the authorities at Lloyd’s, who were responsible
for setting the criteria for admission of Names, and of the members’ agents who
recruited them.  Secondly, it could have affected the Names’ participations on
syndicates specialising in high-risk business:  when there was no counterparty credit
risk assessment of individual Lloyd’s syndicates, factors that might otherwise have
prevented members’ agents from placing Names without sufficient financial strength on
high-risk syndicates, or from applying too high a proportion of Names’ participations
to them, were weakened.  Thirdly, it could have affected the behaviour of managing
agents and their underwriters, because syndicates could accept exposures that were
excessive in relation to the capital-support provided by some or all of their Names, or
write business at premium levels that other insurers regarded as uneconomic, without
undermining their customers’ confidence that any claims would be paid.
Any or all of these consequences of moral hazard might, of course, have been expected
to damage the Lloyd’s market or undermine customers’ confidence in the Lloyd’s
policy in the long run.  They could, in principle, have been prevented through
regulation of the Lloyd’s market.  My contention, however,  is that the self-regulatory
                                                            
5 The Central Fund is also used to replenish premium trust funds for shortfalls resulting from any
Name failing to pay a call, even if the syndicate as a whole has had sufficient funds to pay claims in
full.
6 If the Central Fund is exhausted the funds belonging to the Corporation of Lloyd’s can also be made
available.
7 See Bob Hewes(1991), Head of Regulatory Services at Lloyd’s, who wrote “The Central Fund and
the assets of the Corporation of Lloyd’s exist as the ultimate safeguard and protection for the Lloyd’s
policyholder, in the event of members failing to meet their underwriting obligations.”regime at Lloyd’s in the two decades under review did not in practice provide
sufficient protection against moral hazard and its consequences.
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3 Lloyd’s Names’ wealth
The first proposition is that Lloyd’s admitted a large number of external Names whose
wealth was insufficient to warrant the underwriting of insurance business at Lloyd’s
9.
This occurred because it was perceived to be in the financial interest of the working
Names as a whole, and/or of the members’ agents in particular.
In order to maintain its position in insurance markets Lloyd’s has to attract enough
Names to provide the capacity it requires.  At the end of the 1960s this was seen to be
a problem.  Following losses on business written in 1965 and 1966 membership of
Lloyd’s had been stagnant,
10  “there were complaints about difficulties in placing risks
at Lloyd’s because of lack of capacity”,
11 and “if capacity was seen to be inadequate, a
point might come .... when there was a massive loss of business.”
12   A Lloyd’s
Working Party, with Lord Cromer
13 as an independent chairman and including other
independent members, was set up, part of whose task was “to recommend measures
designed to keep business at Lloyd’s and where practicable increase it.”
14   The
behaviour of Lloyd’s in setting minimum criteria for admission of external Names
subsequently (and the opening up of the market to corporate Names more recently)
was consistent with recurring  business pressures to maintain or augment capacity.
Members’ agents also had an incentive to attract new members to Lloyd’s - their
profits depended on the numbers of members for whom they acted, and the capacity
provided by them.  In the mid-1980s members’ agents were particularly active in
recruiting new Names, on occasion paying commissions to intermediaries who
introduced Names to them
15.
Table 1 shows the number of Names, and the minimum means required of new external
Names commencing business, in each year from 1970 to 1990.  At the time of the
Cromer Working Party the minimum level of means for external Names was set at
£75,000.   The Working Party considered that in future the minimum means should be
£50,000: “The ability to produce a capital sum is needed and the figure of £50,000 is
relatively modest.....In reducing the means test to £50,000, we have gone as far as is
desirable.” Proposals to the Working Party that a lower figure should be set were
                                                            
8 Whether, given the  priorities of  powerful interest groups at Lloyd’s, self-regulation could
realistically have been expected to do so, is a question for some future historian to consider.
9 More specifically, that a significant number of Names would not have been regarded as sufficiently
credit-worthy by the insurance brokers and others who place high-risk business at Lloyd’s if the
covenant of the individual Names had not been supported by the Lloyd’s guarantee.
10 Cromer (1969), p 13, para. 48
11 Ibid. , p7, para. 28.
12 Ibid., p8, para. 29.
13 A former Governor of the Bank of England.
14 Ibid., p8, para. 29.
15 While many of the new  Names were in fact wealthy, a significant number were not.  The moral
hazard applies only to the recruitment of the latter group.rejected,
 and Lloyd’s was recommended to keep the minimum under review in the light
of inflation.
16










1970 6001 75 501.2
1971 6020 50 298.4
1972 6299 50 278.6
1973 7140 50 255.2
1974 7589 75 329.8
1975 7710 75 265.5
1976 8565 37.5 113.9
1977 10662 37.5 98.3
1978 14134 37.5 90.8
1979 17279 37.5 80.1
1980 18552 50 90.5
1981 19137 50 80.9
1982 20145 50 74.5
1983 21601 50 71.2
1984 23436 100 135.6
1985 26019 100 129.2
1986 28242 100 121.8
1987 30936 100 117.8
1988 32433 100 113.1
1989 31329 100 107.8
1990 28770 250 250
      * Active members from 1985
The Working Party’s recommendation of a minimum of £50,000 at the end of 1969
was equivalent to almost £350,000 in 1990 prices, and this £50,000 limit was
implemented for Names commencing business in 1971.  The minimum was increased to
£75,000 for Names commencing in 1974, broadly compensating for the decline in the
value of money in the intervening period.  The reduction in the minimum to £50,000
after 1970 led to a significant increase in the number of  Names, but the rate of growth
tailed off after the real value of the minimum was restored.  Lloyd’s response was not
to maintain the minimum real value, as recommended by Cromer, but to introduce a
new category of  “Mini-Names”, who had to show wealth at only half the normal level
(and whose underwriting limits were correspondingly lower)
17, i.e. with a real value in
1976 of less than 40% of the minimum suggested by the Cromer Working Party.  This
appears to have led to an upward surge in membership, starting in 1976 and continuing
                                                            
16 Ibid., p 19, paras. 74 and 76.
17 The Rowland Task Force Report (1992) states that the Cromer Working Party recommended this
step. (P.22, Exhibit 2).  In fact Cromer recommended a lower limit only for Working Names. (Cromer
(1969), p.19, para. 74.)until 1979 when the minimum, which had fallen in real terms to only a little over a
quarter of the Cromer figure, was increased to £50,000 (full Names, £100,000).
Membership continued to rise, though more slowly, but with inflation continuing the
real value of the minimum means requirement had fallen to less than a quarter of the
Cromer figure by 1983.
In 1983 the Mini-Names category for new Names was abolished, so that the effective
minimum reverted to £100,000 - in real terms still less than half the Cromer figure.
But this was accompanied by a very significant easing of the assets that were eligible in
calculating a prospective Name’s means.  Until then the value attached to a Name’s
owner-occupied house had been excluded or discounted significantly, and bank
guarantees secured on such housing had not been acceptable.  From 1983 on, bank
guarantees secured on owner-occupied houses were accepted.  This meant that people
whose sole significant asset was the house in which they lived could satisfy the asset
criterion for membership of  Lloyd’s.  The growth of membership accelerated, with
rapid growth continuing until 1988 - by which time the real value of minimum shown
means (for full Names) had fallen to the 1976 level for Mini-Names - after which
mounting losses at Lloyd’s
18 discouraged potential new Members.  By 1990 it was
becoming evident that significant numbers of Lloyd’s Names either could not or would
not pay their debts, and the minimum was raised substantially, to £250,000.
There are no statistics measuring the actual levels of Lloyd’s Names wealth
19.
However, data for 1986 record that 13% of external Names at that time had shown
means of less than the minimum for new Names, and that a further 42% showed means
in the range £100,000 - £150,000 that included the minimum (£100,000)  at the time.
20
In 1988 the managing director of one of  Lloyd’s largest agencies drew attention to the
financial weakness of some Names
21: “There are probably quite a number of Names
who either have few liquid assets beyond their stated means or have provided their
deposit with a Bank Guarantee supported by their house.  Also many Names, it is
thought, have passed much of their wealth to their spouses or trusts for their children.”
Later a Lloyd’s Task Force stated that “With hindsight, it is apparent that....it was a
serious mistake to permit some individuals to join who did not have the appropriate
resources to pay losses;”
22  and the Chairman of Lloyd’s told a parliamentary
committee that “Names came into membership overstretching themselves, being
encouraged by their banks and other advisers to do so, and by agents who brought
                                                            
18 Due to both long-tail liabilities and catastrophe insurance.
19 This is one reason why the counterparties who purchase insurance policies from Lloyd’s syndicates
have to rely on the resources available to Lloyd’s as a whole and on the mechanisms for pooling those
resources.
20 Neill (1987), Appendix 6.
21 Anthony G. Carver, Managing Director of Wellington Underwriting Agencies Ltd.,  at a conference
on The Future Lloyd’s, 20/21 June 1988.  An example of a Name with slender means was a Mr
Sword-Daniels, a dentist with a total annual income of less than £35,000 in 1986, whose only
substantial asset was a half share in the equity of his house, which was charged to the bank as security
for a bank guarantee of £100,000, to establish the required minimum of readily realisable assets.
[Gatehouse (1994), pp. 8-9.]
22 Rowland (1992), p. 22, para. 1.12.them in, who never should have been members of the market.”
23   Finally, in 1996, in
the context of proposals for Lloyd’s “Reconstruction and Renewal” the Names’
Committee estimated that some 6000 Names - some 20% of all Names at the time -
“may be unable to pay their ‘finality’ bills in full without further assistance.”
24
The facts are that from the mid-1970s to 1990 Lloyd’s chose to ignore the criteria for
admission standards recommended by the Cromer Working Party, that Lloyd’s
admitted members with means that were only a fraction of those required previously or
subsequently, that this was encouraged by some members’ agents and that the means
of a substantial proportion of Names proved in the event to be inadequate.  These facts
are consistent with moral hazard affecting the recruitment and admission of Names at
Lloyd’s.
4 Lloyd’s Names’ exposure to catastrophe reinsurance
The second proposition is that, as a result of moral hazard, many Lloyd’s Names were
able to commit much too large a proportion of their underwriting capacity to high-risk
catastrophe reinsurance business, and that this resulted in an increase in the capacity
committed by Lloyd’s as a whole to this kind of  business.
Lloyd’s Names’ exposures to the risk of underwriting losses reflect the specialisations
of the syndicates of which they are members and the size and spread of their syndicate
participations.  Few external Names have the expertise to determine these matters
themselves and, as already noted, they normally rely instead on recommendations from
their members’ agents, who have a clear duty to make recommendations that accord
with each Name’s appetite for and capacity to bear risk.
Members’ agents are remunerated by a combination of fees - based on each Name’s
total syndicate participations - and profit commission, which depends on the profits
earned on the Name’s syndicate participations.
25  Prior to 1990, any syndicate losses
were not netted off against profits of other syndicates in the same year.  Members’
agents thus had a significant financial interest in the profitability of the syndicates on
which they placed their Names, but, at least until 1990, suffered no immediate financial
penalty as a result of syndicate losses.
26   Thus members’ agents could expect to earn
more from Names’ participations in syndicates specialising in high volatility business,
characterised by relatively high profits in most years partly offset by relatively rare, but
probably significant, losses, than on syndicates with a more stable profit profile: in
other words, they had a financial incentive that was liable to bias recommendations in
favour of high risk syndicates.
                                                            
23 Treasury and Civil Service Committee, (1994-95), p. 115.
24 Reconstruction and Renewal, (February 1996),  Appendix 1, p. 3]. These Names would be unable to
pay in full even after part of their losses had been met from the Central Fund or other sources and the
outstanding balance had been capped at a maximum of £100,000.  Moreover the 6000 does not
include Names who had already settled their debts as far as possible and who had been unable to pay
them in full.
25 The 1989/90 accounts of 10 large members agencies showed that revenue was divided more or less
equally between fees and profit commission in that year. [Rowland (1992) p.122, Exhibit 63.]
26 The overall profitability of the syndicates on which members’ agents placed Names was, of course,
a factor influencing their ability to attract new Names.In the years between 1965 and 1987 the world-wide reinsurance industry was relatively
undisturbed by major catastrophes, thus generally leaving catastrophe reinsurers with a
22 year span of profitable results.  Moreover there was a shortage of world-wide
capacity for catastrophe reinsurance in the mid-1980s, giving rise to a hardening of
premium rates.
27  This led in turn to an influx of capacity, both in the company market
and, significantly in the context of this paper, at Lloyd’s.  At the same time, there was
excess capacity in some other types of insurance, limiting the demand for new capacity
in these areas.
The issue is whether the shortage of capacity and apparent profitability of catastrophe
reinsurance in the mid-1980s led members’ agents to bias their recommendations in
favour of syndicates specialising in this business, without giving due weight to their
Names’ financial resources and appetites for risk.  Names could not generally be
expected to appreciate the magnitude of the risks to which these syndicates were
exposed, and the high credit standing of Lloyd’s as a whole meant that even Names
who could not reasonably bear the risks were in a position to participate in the
business.
The starting point is the question of how much exposure to catastrophe reinsurance
would be reasonable in the context of any Name’s portfolio of syndicate participations
and of that Name’s means and appetite for risk.  Clearly, since the returns on
catastrophe reinsurance have little correlation with the returns from other kinds of
insurance, a case can be made for including some exposure in order to improve the
prospective return to risk ratio for the Name.  However, for Names with limited
means, that exposure may well be less than the minimum size of for a syndicate
participation.  Moreover, syndicates emphasising other categories of insurance may
well also have some exposure to catastrophes, so that Names without participations on
specialist catastrophe reinsurance syndicates are liable in practice to be exposed to
some catastrophe losses.
Good practice at Lloyd’s provides some answers, and in determining good practice the
English Courts have relied on the advice of expert witnesses.  One such witness
28
classified syndicates into three categories - standard, medium and high risk - with the
high risk category being those for which the loss potential
29 was greater than 30% of
their annual premium income limit and could be as high as 100%.
30  In practice the
high-risk category comprised specialist catastrophe excess of loss reinsurers, including
some that wrote a considerable proportion of high-level retrocession business.  Since,
under Lloyd’s rules, Names could (and generally did) have syndicate participations
permitting underwriting of premiums up to 2.5 times their shown means, the potential
for loss as a percentage of their shown means was 2.5 times the percentage share of
                                                            
27 See  Fryer (1986) p. 14: “The shortage of capacity at the present time has done wonders for the
resolve of reinsurance underwriters”.
28 Mr Robin Wilshaw.  Information about the classification of syndicates and appropriate levels of
participation in them by Names can be found in Clementson (1996)  Day 14, pp. 46-47 and 70-74/
29 The loss potential can be interpreted as what might reasonably be expected in a bad year - higher
levels of loss could not, of course, be altogether excluded.
30 See Gatehouse (1994), p 10 and 17.such syndicates in their portfolios.  The medium-risk syndicates, which were likely to
form the bulk of any portfolio, had potential loss ratios in the range 10% to 30% of
their annual premium income limits, and might include some catastrophe reinsurance or
even a small amount of catastrophe retrocession business.  Unless specifically
instructed by a Name to do so, good practice dictated that members’ agents should not
recommend participations on the high-risk category of syndicates exceeding 10% of
any Name’s total participations, with a lower 5% limit applicable to Names with only
limited shown means or who were new to Lloyd’s.
31
Statistical analysis of Names’ exposure to high risk-syndicates showed that almost half
of all external Names in 1988 had 10% or more of their portfolios allocated to these
syndicates, and that for over 10% of Names the figure was 25% or more.  For Names
who joined Lloyd’s in 1988 the proportion with 25% or more was about 18%.
32 In
some cases members’ agents who recommended to Names exposures much higher than
the limits set out by this expert have been found by the Courts to be negligent, e.g. in
the case of Mr Sword-Daniels, referred to above, who had participations on high-risk
syndicates in excess of 40% of his total participations,
33 and whose “limited assets”
were consequently “foreseeably at risk.”
34  While an isolated case of this sort would
hardly constitute evidence of the effects of moral hazard,  detailed analysis of Names’
exposure has shown that Mr Sword-Daniels was by no means an isolated case, and that
Names generally  - advised by many different members’ agents - increased their
exposure to high-risk syndicates to an unwarranted degree in the mid-1980s.  For
example, in 1988 about two thirds of all the members’ agents at Lloyd’s had new
Names with 5% or more of their capacity allocated to high-risk syndicates and one
third had new Names with over 10% of their capacity allocated in this way.
35  On the
basis of such detailed statistical analysis a judge concluded that the figures “constitute
prima facie evidence of widespread negligent portfolio selection advice on the part of
Members’ Agents.”
36
In the event, many of these Names were unable to meet their obligations.  It has been
suggested that the members’ agents who advised them “ did not comprehend what they
were doing.”
37, but this is scarcely credible as an explanation: the level of exposure by
Lloyd’s as a whole to catastrophe reinsurance was public knowledge - brokers and
others had access to the figures for syndicate capacity and members’ agents were
actively involved in the market - and it is beyond belief that such a high proportion of
members’ agents were ignorant of the associated risks.  However, incompetence or
negligence on this scale is consistent with the hypothesis that the moral hazard
resulting from the Lloyd’s guarantee made it possible for many members’ agents to
give biased advice when it was in their financial interest to do so.
In the absence of the guarantee Lloyd’s capacity to write high-risk catastrophe
reinsurance would have been much lower: at least half of the aggregate capacity of
                                                            
31 Clementson (1996), Day 14, pp. 70-74.
32 Clementson (1996) Day 10, pp. 60-63 and  Day 14, pp. 75-78.
33 ibid. p.11.
34 ibid. p.15
35 Clementson (1996), Day 10 pp.64-66, Day 14 pp. 84-88
36 Cresswell (1996), p. 13.
37 Clementson (1996), Day 14, p. 78these syndicates was provided by Names whose allocations exceeded the appropriate
5% or 10% prudential limits in their portfolios.
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5 Managing Agents and Underwriters
The third proposition is that the Lloyd’s guarantee enabled syndicate underwriters to
take on more exposure to risk, to write business at lower premium rates, and to write
kinds of insurance that they would not otherwise have been able to write.
In considering this proposition it would be unreasonable to compare Lloyd’s syndicates
with independent insurance companies of the same size. Catastrophe reinsurance is a
category of  business in which the financial strength of the reinsurer is a key
consideration,
39 and this means that small independent insurance companies are unable
to compete for catastrophe reinsurance and retrocession business on equal terms with
financially strong majors.
40  It follows that the best counterfactual for a Lloyd’s
syndicate writing significant amounts of catastrophe reinsurance business is a specialist
catastrophe reinsurance division (or subsidiary) of a large, high quality insurance
company: Lloyd’s syndicates are supported by the financial strength of Lloyd’s as a
whole, while the division of an insurance company is supported by that company’s
entire capital resources. For the purpose of comparison I shall therefore use as the
counterfactual a hypothetical, large, well-managed insurance company.
41  The issue is
whether management controls within major companies provide a level of protection
against moral hazard that was not matched by the regulatory arrangements within
Lloyd’s.
How do the incentives and constraints that influence the behaviour of managing agents
and underwriters at Lloyd’s differ from those that influence their counterparts in major
insurance companies?  The position of the directors of a firm of managing agents vis-à-
vis the external Names who provide the bulk of the capital is comparable to that of
company directors vis-à-vis their shareholders
42; and the position of the syndicate
underwriter - in particular the active (senior) underwriter -  who is responsible for the
business that the syndicate writes and the extent to which its gross exposure is
protected by reinsurance, is comparable to that of his counterpart in a division of an
insurance company.  In both Lloyd’s and insurance companies these relationships are
subject to well-known principal-agent problems.  However, the problems at Lloyd’s
differ in degree and/or kind from those which occur in joint-stock insurance
companies.
                                                            
38 Clementson (1996) Day 10, pp. 68-69
39 See Kiln (1981): “The quality of reinsurers and their financial stability on catastrophe reinsurance
is of paramount importance....and the higher the layer of protection the more important is the quality
of reinsurers.”.
40 Companies with a poor covenant win business only by quoting correspondingly low premium  rates
- and some such companies failed as a result of the catastrophes of the late 1980s.
41 Not all major insurance companies will have all the features I attribute to this hypothetical
company; few surviving companies will be without any of them!
42 Though the external Names’ only sanction is to withdraw their capital.The first difference is control of exposure to risk.  At Lloyd’s the regulators did not
seek to exert any direct control on syndicates’ exposure to risk: the amount of business
a syndicate could write was limited only by premium income, not by the exposure
involved, and the funds that Names had to place at the disposal of Lloyd’s were
similarly unrelated to the nature of the business underwritten.  Thus the control of
exposure lay entirely in the hands of the managing agents and their underwriters.  In
contrast, the central management of an insurance company is concerned to control
exposure as well as premiums written.  In the absence of central controls Lloyd’s
syndicates were permitted to take on more exposure when premium levels were low
than when they were high - it was left to the managing agents and underwriters to
decide how much business to write - whereas in a company the deterioration in the
risk/reward ratio implied by lower premiums would be expected to curtail the amount
of business written by a catastrophe insurance division.
The second difference is the extent to which underwriters were required to have
relevant expertise in order to write particular categories of business.  Lloyd’s
syndicates had to designate their main categories of business and  employ underwriters
who were acceptable to Lloyd’s for those categories; however, they were also
permitted to write limited amounts of other business, including catastrophe
reinsurance, without having any specialist expertise.  Thus marine underwriters, with
little or no experience in non-marine catastrophe reinsurance or in excess of loss
retrocession business, were able to enter these markets.  In contrast, well-managed
companies do not generally permit one specialist division to write business for which
the underwriters are wholly unqualified and which is the specialism of another division.
A third difference is the structure of incentives for directors and underwriters. At
Lloyd’s the incentives to accept high levels of exposure to risk were very strong.  The
managing agents’ remuneration consisted of both fees and profit commission, the latter
being calculated on annual profits, with no deduction for losses and, until 1994, with
no carry-forward of losses previously incurred by the same syndicate.  Typically the
managing agents received 5% of total syndicate profits as profit commission, and this
comprised the greater part of their revenue.
43   The principals of the managing agents
were also members of the syndicates concerned, and were therefore liable to share as
individuals in any losses. Nevertheless, their risk/reward ratio was much more
favourable than that of the external Names who participated in their syndicates.
The active underwriter’s remuneration was even more highly geared to the syndicate’s
profits (also with no offset for losses).  A typical active underwriter would expect to
receive about 1.75% of the syndicate profits in addition to his basic salary.  Again, the
underwriter would have a participation on the syndicate, so would have some exposure
to risk, but with a typical participation of 0.2% of the syndicate’s capacity, the
risk/reward ratio for the underwriter would be almost ten times as favourable as for an
external Name.
In an effort to align managerial and shareholder interests, companies frequently link
their remuneration structures to divisional or overall company profits.  Directors and
                                                            
43 The 1989/90 accounts of 10 large managing agents showed that for that year 63% of their revenue
was derived from profit commission. [Rowland (1992), p. 122, Exhibit 63.]underwriters, at Lloyd’s and elsewhere, have to consider the consequences for their
reputations and career prospects if things go wrong, and it can be argued that
additional profit incentives are required to compensate for a bias towards excessive
caution.  However, the incentives at Lloyd’s appear to go far beyond what is required
to align interests, and, particularly in the case of highly volatile catastrophe reinsurance
business, well-managed companies would not be expected to gear the remuneration of
divisional managers and underwriters so highly to current profits.  Moreover,
experience in other financial industries has demonstrated that a possible loss of
reputation cannot be relied on to prevent  excessive risk-taking.
It may be objected that the unlimited liability of Lloyd’s Names constitutes a special
factor, which does not apply to their company counterparts, and which would be
expected to constrain the risk-appetite of managing agents and underwriters, and
which therefore justifies additional profit incentives.  There are a number of counter-
arguments.  First, the purpose of gearing remuneration to profits is to align the
interests of management and Names, and (unlike shareholders in insurance companies)
external Names too have unlimited liability.  Secondly, the effectiveness of syndicate
membership as a deterrent to excessive risk-taking will depend on the agent or
underwriter’s own appetite for risk: professional involvement in catastrophe
reinsurance is unlikely to be attractive to highly risk-averse people.  Thirdly, the
management’s willingness to take risks will also depend on the consequences of losses
for their overall financial positions. Some managing agents limited the scale of any
possible losses
44, and some others were in the same position as wealthy external Names
who could readily absorb any likely level of losses.
The evidence suggests that a significant proportion of the professional catastrophe
reinsurers at Lloyd’s did in fact respond to the incentives to seek premium income and
hence potential profits, having insufficient regard to the level of risk.  Whilst about half
of the high-risk catastrophe reinsurers at Lloyd’s avoided cumulative losses in excess
of 50% of their premium limits
45 (or even made profits) in the period 1988-91, the
other half incurred cumulative losses greater than 50% and a quarter had losses
exceeding 100% of their premium limits in a single year.
Losses on such a scale cannot realistically be attributed to either bad luck
46 or
ignorance, and many, if not most, of the specialist catastrophe reinsurance underwriters
in London must have been aware of the risks being run.  At a reinsurance conference in
1988,  prior to the Piper Alpha oil rig disaster, Outhwaite (1988)
47 drew attention to
the unsound nature of the business being conducted in the LMX (London Market
                                                            
44 At a seminar in 1994 Mr C.K. Murray,  Managing Director of R J Kiln, one of the largest
Managing Agents at Lloyd’s and a Deputy Chairman of Lloyd’s  commented that “certain
underwriters, by a combination of high salaries, low percentages in their own syndicates, stop losses
and a variety of other stratagems, have been able to make a fortune while their Names have lost.”  See
also the remarks of Mr Anthony G. Carver quoted on p. 6 above.
45 External Names’ funds at Lloyd’s were a minimum of 30% and their shown means a minimum of
40% of their total syndicate participations.  For a syndicate to lose 50% of its premium limit is
therefore equivalent to a division or subsidiary of a major insurance company losing over 100% of the
capital allocated to it.
46 Mr Wilshaw confirmed that the losses were “totally foreseeable”. [Clementson (1996), Day 14,
p. 104]
47 Quoted at length in Phillips (1994) pp. 59-62.Excess of Loss) market.  He included a hypothetical example of the total loss of an oil
rig valued at $2 million, of which $1.2 million net was provided by the London Market,
and estimated that in that case the level of intended retentions in London would not
have exceeded $100 million.  The remaining “cover” would have been obtained
through spiral reinsurance and retrocession
48 in the London Market, and in the event of
a total loss would end up as unanticipated losses for the reinsurers concerned. This
analysis was public knowledge, at least to the professional reinsurers working in the
London Market.
But the problem lay not only with the specialist catastrophe reinsurance syndicates.
The combination of excess capacity in the marine market at Lloyd’s and the attraction
of apparently high profitability in catastrophe reinsurance led many marine
underwriters to dabble in catastrophe reinsurance business.  This added to Lloyd’s
capacity for reinsurance business and helped to drive premium levels down, particularly
for the higher layers of cover.
49
6 Premiums and Retentions
The fourth proposition is that conditions at Lloyd’s had a significant effect on the
world-wide catastrophe reinsurance market, that the increase in capacity at Lloyd’s
drove down premium rates, particularly for the higher layers of cover, and that as a
result Lloyd’s bore a disproportionate share of the losses resulting from catastrophes at
the end of the 1980s.
A US insurance industry study [AIRAC (1986)] of the incidence of losses that would
have been experienced if the Eastern Seaboard had been struck by two hypothetical
hurricanes in 1984, with insured losses of $7 billion each, estimated that Lloyd’s would
bear just over 15% of the total losses.
50  Since some 35% would have been borne by
the primary insurers, Lloyd’s share of the reinsurance and retrocession losses
amounted to almost 25%. With a market share of this size any substantial expansion or
contraction of capacity at Lloyd’s could be expected to have an influence on world-
wide premium rates.
The major increase in Lloyd’s capacity and appetite for catastrophe reinsurance
occurred after 1984, though it is likely that even then some of the capacity was
provided by Names who should not have admitted to Lloyd’s at all and some by
Names whose exposure to catastrophe reinsurance was too high.  However, between
1984 and 1988 Lloyd’s Names grew by nearly 40% (Table 1); by 1988, as shown in
section 4 above, at least half of the capacity of the specialist catastrophe reinsurance
syndicates should not have been provided by the Names concerned; many syndicates at
Lloyd’s were accepting risks greater than was warranted by the capacity of their
syndicates;  and Lloyd’s appetite for catastrophe reinsurance was being further
augmented by non-specialist syndicates.  Capacity elsewhere did not, of course, stand
still - there were developments in Bermuda and there was an influx of “fringe”
companies into the London market.  Nevertheless. starting from a market share of
                                                            
48 For the working and effects of reinsurance spirals, see Bain (1999).
49 Clementson (1996), Day 14, pp. 31,38; Outhwaite (1988), pp. 61-62.
50 AIRAC (1996), Table 4.25%, and with its capacity augmented by a factor of well over two due to the various
manifestations of moral hazard, competitive conditions at Lloyd’s could be expected to
drive down world-wide catastrophe reinsurance premium rates.
This is exactly what occurred.  Premium rates were driven down and retentions were
reduced,
51 and this applied with greatest force to the higher layers of cover: “high-level
catastrophe rates are absurdly low, and are based solely on comparison and precedent
and bear no relation whatsoever to the risk being run”
52  The result was an irrational
pricing structure, leading to opportunities for profitable arbitrage and for other insurers
to limit their catastrophe reinsurance retentions.
Opportunities for profitable arbitrage exist when underwriters are able to provide a low
layer of cover and purchase an equivalent higher layer of cover at a lower premium
without increasing their net retentions.
53  It is risk-free only if the protection purchased
can be guaranteed - otherwise the arbitrageur could be obliged to pay out on the lower
layer of cover without in fact being able to recover the cost.  However, if the higher
layer was provided by a Lloyd’s syndicate that guarantee was a good as Lloyd’s itself.
Inter-syndicate reinsurance at Lloyd’s rose from £250 million in 1982 to £1399 million
in 1990, or from 11.2% to 32.6% of Lloyd’s total net premium income;
54 and
reinsurance placed elsewhere was “often insured on a similar basis back in London.”
55
At the prevailing premium levels other insurers lost interest.  Dr Frey of Swiss Re has
stated that “We did not fight so hard for new business, or sometimes even we did not
fight for any business at all;”
56 and according to Outhwaite “ the amounts (of
catastrophe retrocession) placed overseas are insignificant.”
57
The end-result was that, by comparison with the 15% share estimated in 1984, Lloyd’s
bore an abnormally large proportion of the catastrophe losses at the end of the 1980s.
For example, in the case of the Piper Alpha oil rig disaster, while 40% of the risk
before reinsurance was placed outside the London Market, “a substantial proportion of
the non-London placement was subsequently reinsured back into London as insurers
protected their higher exposures,” so that in the end only 20% of the losses were
retained outside London
58 and Lloyd’s share of the total losses was estimated as 55%.
Comparable figures for Lloyd’s losses due to other catastrophes - the 1987 and 1990




                                                            
51 Clementson (1996), Day 14 pp. 29.30. 37-38.
52 Outhwaite (1988) pp. 61-2.  The problems at Lloyd’s were attributed by Outhwaite to marine
insurers (who did not understand the catastrophe reinsurance market) but were also found amongst
“innocent” or “naive” underwriters in  “fringe” companies in the London market. [Clementson
(1996), Day 16, p. 88].
53 For further discussion of the reasons for irrational pricing see Bain (1999).
54 Statistics Relating to Lloyd’s (1994), Table 3.1.
55 Outhwaite (1988), p.60.
56 Clementson (1996), Day 16, p. 88
57 Outhwaite (1988), p. 60.
58 Mercantile and General Reinsurance (1988).
59 Walker (1992), p. 9, para. 2.1The arrangements within Lloyd’s to guarantee payments to policy-holders can be
expected to have effects comparable to those of state guarantees for insurance
companies.  The experience of Lloyd’s thus provides a case study illustrating the
effects of guarantees in practice.
The moral hazard inherent in guarantee arrangements influenced behaviour at Lloyd’s
in the following ways:
• Individuals, who did not have sufficient capital to support the business they wrote,
were encouraged and/or enabled to become external Names at Lloyd’s.
• Many external Names committed much more capital to high-volatility catastrophe
reinsurance business than their resources warranted: this was reflected in an increase
in the capacity of Lloyd’s as a whole to supply catastrophe reinsurance cover.
• Underwriters of catastrophe reinsurance syndicates were able to accept exposures
that were excessive in relation to the capacity of their syndicates, and underwriters
without specialist catastrophe reinsurance expertise were able to write catastrophe
reinsurance business.
• This led to an underpricing of risk at Lloyd’s, with a consequential concentration of
exposure to catastrophe losses.
These  consequences accord exactly with theoretical predictions of the effects of
guarantees: namely, excessive exposure to, and underpricing of, risk.REFERENCES
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